Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026)
e-ISSN: 2963-7589
Economic and Business Journal | ECBIS
https://ecbis.net/index.php/go/index

WHO REALLY BUYS? DMU DISCOVERY AND MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY IN B2B GEOSPATIAL SERVICES

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:
25 June 2026	19 September 2026	04 November 2026

Abstract

This study examines how a geospatial survey startup in Indonesia discovered and corrected a pre-entry buyer assumption. In-depth interviews with eight participants, two internal company representatives and six from three candidate markets, were analyzed through the Gioia methodology. The research finds that architects are structurally excluded from geospatial survey purchasing decisions in design-and-build construction projects. Purchasing authority sits with civil engineers and technical contractors who control earthwork planning and cost decisions. Thematic analysis produced six aggregate dimensions: demand, adoption barriers, decision making unit, vendor selection criteria, vendor retention drivers, and service expectations. Correcting the assumption reshaped the strategy on three fronts: the product shifted from a topographic map to an engineering-ready deliverable combining three-dimensional terrain, cut-and-fill analysis, and infrastructure mapping; the go-to-market route moved from architect outreach to referral-based sales through technical buyer networks; and the construction market was selected as the primary entry target. These findings contribute to the B2B marketing literature by illustrating buyer assumption error as a distinct risk in market entry strategy, and demonstrate the value of Gioia methodology for surfacing role structures that challenge researcher assumptions.

Keywords: *B2B Market Entry, Buyer Identification, Decision Making Unit, Geospatial Services, Market Development Strategy.*

1. INTRODUCTION

In business-to-business markets, accurately identifying who the real buyer is represents a foundational step in market entry strategy. For firms entering new markets without prior sales experience in that segment, however, buyer identity is frequently assumed rather than verified. This distinction matters because the assumed buyer and the actual buyer can differ substantially, and a go-to-market strategy built around the wrong person will systematically fail even when the underlying demand is real and the product is well-designed.

This paper examines this problem through the case of GeoSurv Indonesia, a startup established in 2025 to pursue market development in the geospatial survey industry. The company entered its market assessment process with the assumption that architects were the

primary potential customers in the construction and urban planning sector. The intuition was logical: architects are the most visible professionals in building projects, and geospatial site data is a recognized input for design work. What the company had not verified was that many architecture firms operate on a design-only scope that explicitly excludes geospatial survey work, which is instead delegated to civil engineers and design-and-build teams responsible for earthwork and site execution.

The problem of misidentifying the buyer is well-grounded in B2B marketing theory. The Decision Making Unit (DMU) framework established by Webster & Wind (1972) describes organizational buying as a group process involving multiple participants with distinct roles: users, influencers, buyers, deciders, and gatekeepers. Kotler et al. (2024) extend this model, emphasizing that firms building their sales strategy around the wrong member of the buying unit risk designing their entire approach around someone who lacks purchasing authority. Johnston & Lewin (1996) further demonstrate that buyer identification errors compound over time: misaligned targeting not only fails to generate sales but reinforces incorrect internal assumptions about why the strategy is not working.

Despite this established framework, the B2B market entry literature has paid limited attention to how early-stage firms identify and correct buyer assumptions before committing resources to a strategy. Most empirical work on DMU analysis focuses on established firms in known markets, not startups entering new segments with limited prior experience. The entrepreneurship literature addresses resource-constrained decision-making through effectuation theory (Astuti, 2024; Sarasvathy, 2001), but buyer identification is not a central concern in that stream. This paper addresses this gap by examining how buyer assumption error manifests and how correcting it propagates across an entire market entry strategy.

This paper addresses three research questions. First, what are the key customer needs and challenges across the candidate markets being considered? Second, which market is most suitable for entry given the company's product, capabilities, and competitive position? Third, how should the market entry strategy be designed once the real buyer has been correctly identified? These questions are examined through the Gioia thematic analysis methodology applied to in-depth interviews with eight participants across three candidate markets.

The paper makes two contributions. Theoretically, it illustrates buyer assumption error as a distinct risk in B2B market entry, one that differs from better-documented risks such as product-market fit failure or competitive misjudgment. Practically, it provides a replicable account of how a resource-constrained startup can use systematic qualitative research to correct pre-entry buyer assumptions before committing to a market strategy.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

2.1 Research Design

This study uses a qualitative case study approach. GeoSurv Indonesia was selected because it presented a clear instance of a firm at the pre-entry stage of market development,

making it possible to study buyer identification and strategy design before significant resources had been committed to any particular market path. The temporal positioning of the study, before market entry rather than after it, is relatively rare in the market development literature and provides insight into pre-entry dynamics that are often reconstructed retrospectively in published cases. The case study design follows Yin (2018), who defines case study research as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth within its real-world context.

2.2 Participants and Data Collection

Primary data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with eight participants. Two internal participants provided access to the company's strategic assumptions, resource profile, and prior market experience: the founder and director with twenty years of industry experience, and the chief executive officer responsible for business development. Six external participants represented the three candidate markets. All interviews were conducted individually; each lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Prior to each interview, all participants were required to read and sign an informed consent form explaining the purpose of the research, the voluntary nature of participation, the confidentiality of participant and organizational identities, and the right to withdraw at any time. Participant names and institutional affiliations are not disclosed; external participants are identified by codes P1 to P6. Table 1 presents the participant profiles.

Table 1 Profile of Interview Participants

Code	Role	Institution/Sector
Internal	President Director	GeoSurv Indonesia
Internal	CEO	GeoSurv Indonesia
P1	Digital Product PM (ex-Game Dev PM)	State-owned tech company / ex private game development
P2	Digital Product PM (ex-Game Dev PM)	
P3	Architect	Private architect studio
P4	Contractor	Private contractor
P5	Team Leader, Regional Income Development	Local government
P6	Tax Verificator	Local government

Source: *Proceed Data, 2026*

Participants were selected using purposive sampling to ensure relevant knowledge, experience, and involvement in geospatial decision-making or purchasing. In construction, one participant was an architect from a design-focused firm and the other was a contractor responsible for design-and-build projects. In local government, both participants were officials from a regional revenue agency. In game development, one participant was a product manager from a state-owned technology company and the other was a startup

entrepreneur. Secondary data from industry reports, regulatory documents, internal company records, and competitor channels were used to triangulate the primary findings.

Interview data were collected through a semi-structured guide developed around the six analytical dimensions: demand, adoption barriers, decision making unit, vendor selection criteria, vendor retention drivers, and service expectations. This structure was informed by the literature review but left open enough to allow unexpected themes to emerge, consistent with the inductive orientation of the Gioia methodology.

2.3 Data Analysis

Interview data were analyzed using the Gioia methodology (Gioia et al., 2013)), which generates theoretical concepts from qualitative data through a structured three-stage process. This methodology was selected for two reasons. First, its informant-centric orientation prioritizes the language and categories used by participants themselves, which is important in a study aimed at understanding how market actors describe their purchasing roles and decision processes. Second, its iterative structure makes the analytic path from raw data to theoretical constructs transparent and auditable.

In the first stage, open coding produced 1st-order concepts grounded directly in informant language. In the second stage, these concepts were grouped into 2nd-order themes representing analytical patterns across participants. In the third stage, 2nd-order themes were aggregated into higher-level dimensions. The resulting data structure is presented in Table 2 in the Results section.

To strengthen credibility, data triangulation was applied throughout. For market needs and challenges, member checking was carried out by sharing identified themes with selected participants to confirm that interpretations reflected their experiences. Interview findings were also compared with industry reports and relevant literature. For qualitative validity more broadly, the study follows Lincoln & Guba (1985) criteria of credibility (member checking, triangulation), transferability (thick description), dependability (consistent use of the Gioia structure), and confirmability (explicit data structure showing the analytic path).

For the strategic analysis, findings from the thematic analysis were examined using Porter's Five Forces, PESTLE analysis, Resource-Based View (RBV), VRIO framework, SWOT, and TOWS matrix to assess GeoSurv Indonesia's competitive position. Target market selection was evaluated against three criteria adapted from Kotler et al. (2024): market size and growth potential, structural attractiveness, and fit with the company's objectives, resources, and capabilities. The marketing strategy was developed using STP framework, Value Proposition Canvas (Osterwalder et al., 2014), Strategy Canvas and Four Actions Framework (Kim & Christensen, 2015), and 7Ps marketing mix (Zeithaml et al., 2024).

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results and discussion are organized around the central phenomenon of the paper. This study begin with an overview of the thematic analysis structure, then present demand patterns across the three candidate markets, the buyer assumption error and its evidence, target market selection, and close with the strategic and theoretical implications of correcting the buyer assumption.

3.1 Thematic Analysis Result

Table 2 presents the full Gioia thematic analysis result, showing the progression from 1st-order concept using informant language through 2nd-order themes to the six aggregate dimensions that organize the findings.

Table 2 Thematic Analysis Result

1st-Order Concepts (Informant Language)	2nd-Order Themes	Aggregate Dimensions
Geospatial embedded in earthwork cost calculation	Construction demand is recurring and cost-critical	Demand
Tax administration drives land boundary mapping	Government demand is structural and outsourced	Demand
Game development use cases are conceptual / adjacent	Game development demand is latent	Demand
Manual methods perceived as free and sufficient	Perceived substitutability of free methods	Adoption Barriers
Pricing structure unknown or assumed expensive	Pricing opacity reinforces cost concerns	Adoption Barriers
Low awareness of what the service provides	Legibility of value is low in non-construction markets	Adoption Barriers
Architects receive only boundary data, pass soil data to civil	Design scope excludes geospatial purchasing	Decision Making Unit
Technical buyers (civil engineers, contractors) drive purchasing	Purchasing authority sits with technical functions	Decision Making Unit
Vendors sourced through personal connections, not market search	Referral networks are the dominant sourcing channel	Decision Making Unit
First screening: does the vendor capability match the need?	Capability screening precedes price comparison	Vendor Selection Criteria
Price is decisive in tender / government contexts	Price sensitivity is context-dependent	Vendor Selection Criteria
Quality matters more than price in private sector	Value orientation in private firm procurement	Vendor Selection Criteria
Vendor blacklisted if deliverable does not match promise	Execution reliability determines retention	Vendor Retention Drivers
Large price increases trigger search for alternatives	Price stability matters for long-term relationships	Vendor Retention Drivers
Clients build in-house if value is easy to replicate	In-house substitution risk when value is imitable	Vendor Retention Drivers
Use-case framing more persuasive than capability pitch	Concrete use cases drive adoption decisions	Service Expectations

1st-Order Concepts (Informant Language)	2nd-Order Themes	Aggregate Dimensions
Cut-and-fill analysis still done in 2D, results unclear	Analytical completeness is the primary unmet need	Service Expectations
Output must integrate with client software (AutoCAD, BIM)	Software compatibility is an entry requirement	Service Expectations
Speed and accuracy together required for government work	Government expects high throughput without quality loss	Service Expectations

Source: *Proceed Data, 2026*

The six aggregate dimensions capture distinct aspects of how potential buyers engage with geospatial survey services. Demand and adoption barriers describe the market context, while decision making unit identifies who actually holds purchasing authority. Vendor selection criteria and vendor retention drivers reflect how buyers evaluate and maintain vendor relationships. Service expectations reveal what buyers want from a provider beyond basic technical delivery. The following sub-sections discuss the findings organized around these dimensions.

3.2 Demand Patterns and Needs Across Candidate Markets

Within the two active markets, the nature of demand differs. In construction, geospatial survey is embedded in the financial calculation of site preparation. Terrain data drives the calculation of earthwork volumes, a cost category that one contractor described as potentially exceeding half of the total project budget. The service is used at the earliest stages of project planning and is repeated across projects, making it a recurring rather than occasional purchase. Local government demand is similarly regular, structured around annual tax administration cycles that require parcel-level property data at significant scale. One official noted that the agency deploys between fifty and sixty external surveyors for three to four months each year, a commitment that far exceeds the internal team's capacity and makes outsourcing structurally necessary rather than optional.

In game development, by contrast, the clearest use cases identified by participants were adjacent to game production rather than central to it, including asset mapping for administrative dashboards and spatial data for tokenization platforms. Within game development itself, geospatial needs remained conceptual. One participant noted that awareness of what the service provides and what it costs was still very limited among potential users:

> "*kita sama-sama masih belum aware manfaatnya ... memang ada yang provide itu dan benefit utamanya apa*" [we are not yet aware of the benefits, of whether anyone provides it and what the main benefit is] (P2, Game Development)

The primary barrier here is not budget but legibility of value. Several challenges cut across all three markets regardless of demand maturity. Substitution by manual methods and no-cost tools is widespread, pricing opacity leads many to assume the service is expensive before verifying, and vendor selection in all three markets relies heavily on peer referral and documented project history rather than formal search.

3.3 The Buyer Assumption Error: Architects Are Not the Decision Makers

The pre-entry logic behind targeting architects was straightforward: architects are the most publicly visible professionals in building projects, design work requires site data, and therefore architects represented the natural entry point for a geospatial survey service. What this logic missed was that scope boundaries within many architecture practices explicitly exclude geospatial work from their deliverables.

The architect participant (P3) articulated this boundary directly from professional experience:

> "*ada firma yang ngambil skopnya desain doang ... kalau design dia tidak mensertakan geospasial ... datanya ke saya ke arsitek cuma garis batas, data tanah di-oper ke sipil*" [there are firms that only take on the design scope, where design does not include geospatial. The data I receive as an architect is just the boundary line, and the soil data is passed on to the civil team] (P3, Architect)

The contractor participant (P4) confirmed the same pattern from the opposite direction, noting that many design-focused architects are entirely unaware that geospatial survey services exist as a distinct commercial offering:

> "*nggak semua arsitek ... mereka awam banget, mereka nggak tahu, bahkan mereka banyak yang nggak tahu*" [not all architects, many of them are completely unaware, in fact many of them have no idea] (P4, Contractor)

Taken together, these accounts reveal that two conditions must hold for a buyer to be reachable through architect targeting: the architect must be part of the geospatial purchasing decision, and the architect must be aware that such a service exists. The research shows that neither condition is reliably met among design-focused practitioners. The actual locus of purchasing authority sits with the technical functions — civil engineers and design-and-build contractors — who plan and price the earthwork that geospatial data makes possible.

The DMU finding reinforced this. P4 described how vendor sourcing in this market operates entirely through personal connections rather than market search:

> "*saya nggak tahu ada vendor kayak gitu, saya nggak tahu nyarinya di mana ... biasanya nanya kenalan, terus ada teman yang bisa ... nyari kenalan yang orang kayak gitu, bukan nyari perusahaannya*" [I do not know where to find one, so usually we ask connections and there is a friend who can help, looking for a person rather than the company] (P4, Contractor)

The service expectations data pointed to the same conclusion from a different angle. The most significant unmet need in the construction market was not greater survey precision but analytical completeness. P3 described the state of cut-and-fill analysis:

> "*cut and fill ... angkanya tuh gelap ... karena dia masih 2 dimensi sekarang hitungnya*" [cut and fill, the numbers are unclear because it is still being calculated in two dimensions] (P3, Architect)

This is a pain point that belongs to the engineer, not the architect, and designing the product around architect needs would have missed it entirely.

3.4 Target Market Selection

Each potential market was evaluated against three criteria adapted from Kotler et al. (2024): market size and growth potential, structural attractiveness, and fit with the company's objectives, resources, and capabilities. Table 3 presents the evaluation summary.

Table 3 Target Market Evaluation Summary

Criteria	Game Development	Construction & Urban Planning	Local Government
Market size and growth potential	Low. Demand is latent and use-case specific; strongest needs appear in adjacent industries, not core game development.	High. Construction contributes around 10% of national GDP; demand is broad, recurring, and tied to core operations.	Medium. Needs are large and recurring, but current spending is constrained by national budget reallocation.
Structural attractiveness	Medium. Few direct competitors, but free substitutes are strong and the education effort required is high.	Medium–High. Large players concentrate on government projects above IDR 1 billion, leaving smaller private projects less contested.	Low–Medium. Tenders are price-driven and favor experienced incumbents; procurement is complex and time-consuming.
Fit with company objectives, resources, and capabilities	Low. Entry requires major internal adjustment and new investment in data storage, software, and acquisition methods.	High. The MapReady product was developed from this market's data needs; the founder's experience and network are most relevant here.	Medium. The founder understands government processes but the company lacks the track record that tenders require.
Overall rating	Low	High (Primary Target)	Medium (Secondary Target)

Source: *Proceed Data, 2026*

The construction and urban planning market scored highest across all three criteria. Its demand profile was the strongest, with recurring multi-project needs tied directly to cost-critical earthwork decisions and a market size supported by construction's position as a major contributor to national GDP. Its competitive structure was more favorable because large incumbents have moved upmarket toward government contracts, leaving smaller private projects in a relatively uncontested space. The company's fit was also highest: the MapReady product was built from this market's data needs, and the founder's professional network is most dense in this segment. The local government market presented attractive underlying demand but required a track record the company had not yet accumulated, and its procurement timelines were further compressed by a national budget reallocation at the time of the study. Game development scored lowest, with latent demand, high investment requirements, and no clear near-term conversion path.

3.5 Strategic Implications of Correcting the Buyer Assumption

Identifying the wrong buyer is not simply a sales problem. Correcting the buyer assumption triggered three interconnected adjustments: to the segment being targeted, to the offering being proposed, and to the channels and messages used to reach buyers.

On product, the correction redirected development effort from survey detail toward analytical readiness. The adapted MapReady offering replaces the conventional deliverable a contour map requiring further interpretation with a package that includes accurate three-dimensional terrain, scenario-based cut-and-fill analysis, infrastructure element mapping for roads and utilities, and output formats calibrated to the engineering software in use on the project site. Three service guarantees were attached: accuracy aligned with actual site conditions, configurability to the client's workflow, and free revisions without time limit. This design was driven by the technical buyer's identified need for data they can act on rather than data they must still process a distinction that would not have emerged from architect-centered research.

The positioning statement that followed was: "*For technical teams in design-and-build projects, GeoSurv delivers engineering-ready site data rather than raw maps*." A strategy canvas comparison confirmed that this position occupies a genuinely different space from conventional geospatial firms, which compete primarily on price proximity and personal connections while leaving analytical completeness, software integration, and pricing transparency underserved. In Kim & Christensen (2015) terms, the value curve diverges rather than overlaps the signature of a blue ocean move precisely because the corrected buyer revealed a set of unmet needs the existing market did not address.

On channels, the vendor discovery finding had direct implications. Because technical buyers source providers through peer referral rather than online search, the go-to-market approach prioritizes the founder's existing professional network as the primary entry channel, supplemented by direct outreach and partnership development with design-and-build firms in the initial geographic markets of Lombok, Bali, NTT, and NTB. A structured referral process from satisfied clients becomes a promotional channel in its own right, since track record and peer verification are the primary selection criteria in this market. A twenty-four-month phased plan sequences these activities: foundation and market entry in the first three months, track record building through months four to twelve, preparation for secondary market entry from months thirteen to eighteen, and opportunistic local government engagement from month nineteen onward**.**

3.6 Theoretical Contributions

This paper makes two contributions to the B2B marketing and entrepreneurial market development literatures.

The first is theoretical. The paper illustrates buyer assumption error as a distinct risk category in B2B market entry one that differs from better-documented risks such as product-market fit failure or competitive misjudgment. Existing DMU research (Kotler et al., 2024; Webster & Wind, 1972) describes the structure of organizational buying, but it largely assumes that the firm already knows which unit to target. This paper shows that this assumption cannot be taken for granted, particularly for startups entering unfamiliar market segments. A firm can face genuine demand and have a suitable product, yet still fail if it

directs its effort at the wrong member of the buying unit. The buyer assumption error in this case was not the result of poor analysis but of a logical extrapolation from visible industry structure that turned out to be wrong. The correction only became possible through empirical participant selection that deliberately included both the visible professional (architect) and the less visible technical buyer (contractor).

The second contribution is methodological. The Gioia methodology proved productive in this context precisely because its informant-centric approach surfaces role structures that challenge the researcher's prior assumptions rather than confirming them. The key analytical move was including a contractor alongside an architect in the construction market interviews. Had only architects been interviewed, the scope boundary would never have surfaced and the buyer assumption would have been confirmed by the data rather than corrected. This suggests that broad participant selection covering multiple roles rather than only the most visible professional is a methodological priority for pre-entry buyer research.

This study also contributes to research on entrepreneurial market development in emerging economies. Consistent with the effectuation logic documented by Astuti (2024) in Indonesia's digital industries, GeoSurv Indonesia began from what it had the founder's twenty years of industry experience, an existing technical capability, and a small professional network and used systematic market research to identify which market those resources best fit. The buyer identification error was embedded in the company's initial resource framing, and the research was what corrected it. This suggests that even effectuation-oriented startups need structured empirical buyer research before committing to a market entry target.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper examined how a geospatial survey startup discovered that its assumed buyer in the construction market differed from the actual buyer, and how correcting that assumption reshaped the entire market entry strategy. Architects, despite their central role in building design, are structurally excluded from geospatial survey purchasing decisions in design-and-build projects, which are controlled by civil engineers and technical teams with different needs, evaluation criteria, and communication preferences.

Two contributions follow from these findings. Theoretically, the paper establishes buyer assumption error as a distinct category of market entry risk in the B2B marketing literature. A startup can face real demand and have a suitable product yet still fail if it targets the wrong member of the buying unit. Practically, the case demonstrates that early-stage firms can correct buyer assumptions before entry if they conduct systematic qualitative research with the right participants specifically, participants who represent both the visible professional and the actual purchasing authority in a given market segment.

For practitioners, the clearest implication is that buyer research should precede go-to-market design, not follow it. The cost of interviewing a contractor alongside an architect before market entry is negligible compared to the cost of building a sales and product strategy around the wrong person. The second implication is for participant selection: visible professionals are often the wrong starting point. Identifying who actually controls the

relevant budget and makes the vendor selection decision requires deliberate sampling across roles, not just across firms.

This study has several limitations. It is based on a single case in the Indonesian geospatial market, and the specific role separation between architects and civil engineers may vary across project types, firm sizes, and regulatory environments. The participant sample in each market is small. The study was conducted before market entry, so it does not capture how the corrected strategy performed in practice. Future research could examine buyer assumption errors across multiple cases and market types, test whether the correction patterns identified here generalize to other technical service categories where visible and actual buyers differ, and track whether corrected pre-entry strategies produce better outcomes than uncorrected ones.

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